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 Abstract 
This paper adopts a real options framework to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of four 
types of subsidies that aim to encourage a socially desirable land use under return 
uncertainties and costly reversibility of land use change.  We first present a land 
conversion model to show how the subsidies that are expected net present value (ENPV) 
equivalent can change a representative farmer‟s optimal land conversion rules differently 
for converting land into an alternative use as well as converting out of it. This is because 
these subsidies affect the land conversion costs, land return level and uncertainty 
differently. Then in the context of encouraging energy crop production, we compare the 
probabilities of inducing the representative farmer to convert land from a current crop to 
an energy crop across four subsidies for the same, fixed 30-year expected government 
budget. Results of Monte Carlo simulations show that the insurance subsidy results in the 
highest probability of land being converted to the energy crop, followed by the constant 
subsidy.  Although the cost-sharing subsidy and the variable subsidy encourage land 
conversion to the energy crop, they also reduce the incentive to retain land in it. Over 
time, these two subsidies have little effect on the probability of land converting into 
energy crops compared to the no-subsidy baseline. Combining the establishment cost-
sharing subsidy with other annual subsidies has no added effect over single subsidies in 
inducing land conversion to the energy crop.  
Key words:  agricultural subsidies, cost-effectiveness, two-way land conversion, real 
options, Monte Carlo simulations 
 








    
Alternative Land Use Policies: Real Options with Costly Reversibility 
 
Agricultural subsidies have been used to induce socially desirable land uses for a long 
time. An example is the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program, in which farmers set aside 
production land to provide environmental benefits and receive payments from 
government in return. One strategy to mitigate climate change proposed in the United 
States and Canada is subsidizing farmers to convert the marginal agricultural land to 
forest for more carbon sequestration (Stavins 1999; McKenney et al. 2004; Lubowski, 
Plantinga, and Stavins 2006).  A body of literature has analyzed the effects of subsidies 
on the land use change, such as Stavins and Jaffe (1990) and Plantinga, Mauldin and 
Miller (1999). A common assumption in these literature is that a farmer will compare the 
expected net present value (ENPV) of returns to different land uses and choose the one 
with the highest ENPV. Thus subsidizing a desirable land use will raise its return and 
induce land converted to it. ENPV decision rule implies that the form of the subsidy, such 
as lump sum or continuous, constant or variable, does not matter. Subsidies that are equal 
under the ENPV rule are implicitly assumed to give farmers the same incentive to convert 
land to the desirable use.  
      It has been observed that farmers often do not convert land even it is profitable to do 
so under the ENPV rule (Isik and Yang 2004; Plantinga et al. 2002). Parks (1995) 
explained land conversion hysteresis as a consequence of risk aversion and expected 
capital gains. He also explored the effects of some types of conversion subsidies. 
Although not explicitly clear, in his model a cost-sharing subsidy and a constant annual 
rental payment that do not change the uncertainties of land return can give a farmer the same conversion incentive if their annualized values are equal. In contrast, the real 
options framework shows that the interaction among irreversible sunk cost, uncertainty, 
and learning can cause even risk-neutral farmers to be more reluctant to convert land uses 
than the NPV rule predicts (e.g., Titman 1985). More importantly, subsidies taking 
various forms can affect the conversion costs, the level and uncertainty of land use 
returns differently. Subsequently they will affect the farmers‟ land conversion decision 
differently even though they are ENPV-equivalent. 
     The purpose of this paper is to compare the long term effectiveness of different forms 
of agricultural subsidies in achieving an increase in a desired land use when farmers are 
risk neutral. We adopt an innovative real options approach by relaxing the absolute 
irreversibility assumption in previous literature and allowing for land use conversion in 
two directions. A farmer deciding on converting to another land use is allowed to take 
into consideration the future possibility of converting the land back to its original use 
under plausible market conditions. The absolute irreversibility assumption might be 
reasonable for urban development (Capozza and Li 1994; Abebayehu, Keith, and Betsey 
1999). However for agricultural land, a farmer can switch between different uses with 
costs. Allowing two-way land conversion can help capture the flexibility of farmer‟s land 
use decisions. Moreover, it has important implications in designing subsidy programs 
since the subsidies not only change the farmer‟s willingness to convert land into the 
desirable use but also the willingness to convert it out.  
     To make our ideas concrete, we evaluate land conversion subsidies in the context of 
encouraging production of energy crops, which can be directly combusted to provide 
electricity or converted to transportation fuel. Globally the market demand for energy crops is largely driven by various renewable energy policies. For example, in the United 
States, more than 20 states mandate Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), which require 
a certain minimum quantity of electricity produced from eligible renewable energy 
sources. Biomass is an eligible energy source in some states. But more (potential) 
demand for energy crops may come from cellulosic biofuel production. Currently liquid 
biofuels are strongly advocated in many countries, including the United States, due to 
political concerns related to energy security, climate change and rural development 
(Khanna 2008 ; Rajagopal and Zilberman 2007).  Although grain-based biofuel currently 
dominates the market, cellulosic biofuel is believed to have superior environmental 
performance, such as higher net energy, higher carbon credit and more-environmental 
friendly-feedstocks (Schmer et al. 2008; Paine et al. 1996). For this reason, the U.S. 
Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 mandates the use of cellulosic 
ethanol, increasing from 0.1 billion gallons annually in 2010 to 16 billion gallons in 2022. 
To meet this mandate, significant expansion of energy crops is expected to occur on 
agricultural land and compete with traditional crops for the limited acres (Thomson et al. 
2008; Walsh et al. 2003).  
     Coupled with energy policies that induce energy crop production through creating new 
markets for them, many countries also use agricultural subsidies to provide direct 
production incentives.  The perennial nature of most energy crops involves sunk costs to 
establish the plants, which may become prohibitively high for some woody crops. To 
overcome this barrier, a lump-sum payment is often provided to cover the establishment 
costs in full or partial. In the 1990s, Sweden offered 10,000SEK/ha ( roughly $573/acre) 
establishment subsidy for planting willow (Helby, Rosenqvist, and Roos 2006). In early 2007, the Irish government announced it would subsidize half of the establishment costs 
for willow and miscanthus (Styles, Thorne, and Jones 2008). In the United States, the 
Food, Conservation and Energy Act (FCEA) of 2008 introduced direct payments for up 
to 75% of establishment costs for eligible energy crops. In addition to a cost-sharing 
subsidy to help start-up, annual payment is also provided to support production, 
collection, harvest, storage and transportation of energy crops. For example, European 
Union (EU) farmers can receive an annual payment of €45/ha (roughly $25/acre) for 
growing energy crops on production land (Rajagopal and Ziberman 2007).  The Irish 
government subsidizes additional €85/ha (about $45/acre) for growing willow and 
miscanthus (Styles, Thorne, and Jones 2008).  In contrast, the U.S. farmers can receive a 
payment to cover costs of harvest, storage and transportation that is equal to what they 
obtain from biorefiners for 2 years (up to $45/ton). This type of subsidy will vary with 
the market price and yield of biomass.  FCEA also required the Federal Crop Insurance 
Cooperation to study the insurance policies for energy crops, providing the future 
possibility of subsidizing the energy crops insurance. Given that large subsidy amounts 
are spent and take different forms, the effectiveness of these subsidies should be 
systematically evaluated.         
      Our paper contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, we examine a range of 
ENPV-equivalent subsidies, showing how they can affect a representative farmer‟s 
optimal land conversion rule differently, depending on their effects on the conversion 
costs, returns level and variability of returns.  Second, we examine how optimal land 
conversion strategies differ between a real options framework assuming irreversible land 
use decisions and our framework, which allows reversion to a prior land use. In this framework, it turns out that subsidies not only change the farmer‟s willingness to convert 
land into energy crops but also the willingness to convert back out. Third, based on this 
improved model, we compare the effectiveness of subsidy programs for encouraging the 
production of energy crops.  
       The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a 
general land conversion decision model without governmental intervention to better 
expose the idea of uncertainty and sunk costs causing hysteresis in land conversion.  Next, 
we examine how various forms of subsidies for energy crops can change a representative 
farmer‟s land conversion decision rule differently even though they are ENPV-equivalent. 
Then we perform a Monte Carlo simulation on the farmer‟s annual land use choice under 
each type of subsidy over a period of 30 years. The subsidy levels are calibrated so that 
they have the same expected cost to the governmental and their long-term performances 
are compared according to the increased expected conversion rate into energy crops than 
no subsidy support.  Finally we give results and conclusions.  
Land Conversion Decision Model 
Decision without Governmental Intervention 
Consider a representative, risk neutral farmer with a unit of land facing two competing 
crop production alternatives: a corn-soybean rotation and switchgrass, which are selected 
as representative of a traditional crop and an energy crop. The returns to corn-soybean 
and switchgrass at period t are denoted by  () cs t  and  () sw t  , respectively. The farmer 
can convert land from corn-soybean to switchgrass with a lump-sum cost  cs C  or vice 
versa with a lump-sum cost 
sw C . The farmer seeks to maximize the net present value of current and future returns at a discount rate r over an infinite time horizon. The future 
returns to corn-soybean and switchgrass are assumed to evolve according to the 
geometric Brownian motion (GBM)
 1:                       
 (1)  i i i i i i d u dt dz                                      { , } i cs sw                                             
where  i dz is the increment of a Wiener process. The correlation coefficient of the two 
return processes is   , i.e.,  () cs sw E dz dz dt   .  Traditional crop and energy crop returns 
could be correlated for a variety of reasons, e.g. both are linked with energy prices and 
are subject to macro-economic shocks.  
     According to the ENPV decision rule, the farmer will switch from one crop to another 
when the ENPV of switching is higher than staying, i.e., 
(2)    Convert if  
00
( ) ( ) rt i rt
ji E t e dt C E t e dt 
          , { , }, and  i j cs sw i j            
 The real options literature has pointed out that the ENPV approach ignores that the agent 
can optimally postpone their actions due to the irreversibility and uncertainty of future 
returns. Next we derive the optimal decision using real options approach.   Let  
( , ) i
cs sw V  be the value function of currently being in land use i, which is defined as 
the expected net present value of all future returns starting from corn-soybean and then 
following optimal policies.  Due to the option of converting into use  ji  , the payoff 
depends on the distribution of future returns of both land uses, the information for which 
is contained in the two current returns,  () cs t  and  () sw t  .  At time t, the farmer chooses 
between keeping the land in use i and converting it into alternative use j:  
                                                 
1 We drop off the time t to simplify the notation whenever it does not cause confusion.  (3) 
  ( , ) max ( ) ( ( ), ( )),  ( ( ), ( )) i rdt i j i
cs sw i cs sw cs sw V t dt e EV t dt t dt V t t C             
 
The first term on the right hand side describes the payoffs if the land is kept in use i: in 
the infinitesimal period [ , ] t t dt  , the farmer receives profit from land use i at rate  () i t  , 
and at the end of the period, receives the new discounted expected payoff 
() rdt i e EV t dt   . The second term on the right hand side describes the payoff if the land 
is converted into use j: the farmer receives the expected payoff of use j,  () j Vt , but incurs 
the conversion cost  i C .                
     Intuitively, the conversion decision will depend on the relative returns of the two 
competing crops. For example, for any return level of  cs  , there will be a critical value 
*
sw  with which continuing in corn-soybean is optimal if  *
sw sw   and conversion is 
optimal if *
sw sw   .  The  * () sw cs  will form a critical conversion boundary in the 
cs sw    space. Similarly, there is another conversion boundary from switchgrass to 
corn-soybean  * () cs sw  . Following the standard procedures of solving the real options 
problems, we can characterize the optimality conditions of our land conversion decision. 
In the continuation region (where the agent continues in current land use), the value 
functions need to satisfy the following the equation:  
(4)  22
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This is a no-arbitrage condition expanded by Ito‟s lemma, implying that the rate of return 
of investing   i V  dollars (left-hand side) should be equal to the rate of return generated by land use i (right-hand side).  On the boundaries of conversion, the payoffs of continuing 
in the current use should be equal to the payoffs of converting minus the conversion costs, 
along with their derivatives. These are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions:  
(5)  ( , ) ( , ) i j i
cs sw cs sw V V C           when  *() i i j       , { , }, and  i j cs sw i j    
(6)    
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            
when  *() i i j     , { , },and  i j cs sw i j    
 
  The system of equations (4)-(6) subject to (1) implicitly defines the unknown value 
functions and two conversion boundaries. A key insight of the real options approach is 
that when the land is in use i, say in traditional crops, the farmer has the option of 
converting it into energy crops when market conditions are “favorable.” Once converted, 
it is costly to revert back to traditional crops if the market conditions turn out to be less 
favorable. Thus, sticking to the current land use (in traditional crops) has an additional 
value, called option value, derived from the option of converting it into the alternative use 
(in energy crops). But since the land in energy crops can be further converted back to 
traditional crops (albeit at a cost), the option value of converting from traditional crop to 
energy crops further depends on the option value associated with converting in the other 
direction, from energy crop to traditional crops. The mutual dependence of the two option 
values significantly complicates the solution algorithm. Except in special cases, such as 
when value functions are homogeneous of degree one, there is no analytical solution to 
(4)-(6).  Instead, we solve the model numerically using the collocation method (Miranda 
and Fackler 2002; Fackler 2004). This method approximates the unknown value functions using a linear combination of n known basis functions and fixes the coefficients 
by solving a system of n equations that are derived from the optimality conditions (4)-(6). 
Appendix A provides more details.  
    Table 1 presents the parameters we use to solve the model. More details about the 
parameter estimation are documented in the first essay (Song, Zhao, and Swinton 2010).  
In summary, historical data on corn and soybean returns were obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), while data on switchgrass returns were constructed 
from historical ethanol prices and production cost that are taken from various sources. 
The drift parameters and variance parameters of the two crop return series were 
econometrically estimated. The land conversion costs were taken from literature (Khanna, 
Dhungana, and Clifton-Brown 2008; Williams et al. 2009). We assume that the two 
returns have a correlation coefficient of 0.3, instead of -0.3 as estimated in essay 1. 
Historical returns to corn-soybean and switchgrass could be negatively correlated as 
indicated by our estimation results. Part of the reason is that switchgrass revenue is 
simulated as a function of petroleum price and thus highly positively correlated with 
petroleum, whereas until 2005, corn-soybean returns were negatively correlated with 
petroleum prices due to petroleum used as transportation and fertilizer inputs. However, 
this pattern of negative correlation could change as more corn and soybean are used to 
produce biofuels, and as agricultural and petroleum markets become more integrated. 
Then high petroleum prices may push up corn and soybean prices, increasing their returns. 
A supporting evidence is that the correlation between the annual ethanol price  and corn-
soybean return for year 1982-2005 is -0.07, and it changes to 0.28 for year 2006-2008. 
Tyner (2009) shows similar result that the price correlation between crude oil and corn change from -0.29 during period 1988-2005 to 0.8 during period 2006-2008. Furthermore, 
the positive correlation may become stronger as switchgrass or other energy crops expand 
production and compete with corn-soybean for limited land.  
     Figure 1 shows the two boundaries for conversions from corn-soybean to switchgrass 
( cs b  ) and from switchgrass to corn-soybean ( sc b  ). The two boundaries divide the  
cs sw    space into three regions. Above the boundary cs b  , it is optimal to convert 
from corn-soybean to switchgrass.  Below the boundary sc b  , it is optimal to convert 
from switchgrass to corn-soybean. Between the two boundaries, it is optimal to keep land 
in its current use.  The large inaction zone indicate significant hysteresis in land 
conversion decisions. For instance, the calculated switchgrass returns based on 2009 
prices is $133/acre while the corn-soybean return in 2008 is $119/acre (both in 1982 
dollars).
2 If the land is currently in corn-soybean, the minimum switchgrass return for 
converting the land to switchgrass is  (119) cs b  $345/acre, which is significantly higher 
than the $ 204/acre threshold value under ENPV rule.
3 Thus, the land will be kept in a 
corn-soybean rotation even though  sw cs   . Conversely, if the land is already in 
switchgrass, the required minimum corn-soybean return for converting into corn-soybean 
is about $ 260/acre. Thus, the land currently in switchgrass will not be converted either. 
Decision under Different Subsidies 
                                                 
2 2009 corn and soybean returns are not available yet from USDA.  
3 The conversion boundaries under ENPV are:  ( ) ( ) C S cs sw
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conversion from switchgrass to corn-soybean. Above we have described various subsidies for supporting energy crop production 
currently used or proposed in many countries.  They can be categorized into four types: (a) 
a constant annual subsidy, denoted by f; (b) a variable annual subsidy, which is a 
percentage of return, denoted by  ; (c) an insurance policy, which guarantees a 
minimum annual return of  sw  from energy crops; and (d) a lump-sum payment made to 
the switchgrass grower either for the first year of growing switchgrass or for the 
reestablishment after a 10-year rotation, denoted by s. The constant subsidy and variable 
subsidy are abstracted from annual payments used in European countries and the United 
States, respectively. The insurance subsidy is a mimic of the proposed revenue-based 
commodity support program in FCEA (more details can refer to Cooper 2009) or possible 
insurance policy to be designed for energy crops proposed in EISA.  
      If farmers are risk-neutral and make decisions according to the ENPV rule, different 
forms of subsidies can give them the same incentive to convert land to energy crops as 
long as they have the same ENPV by equation (2).  This implies that for a given 
governmental budget, these subsidies will perform the same in terms of attracting the 
land to grow energy crops. However, using the dynamic land conversion decision model 
developed above, we will show that ENPV-equivalent subsidies can affect the land 
conversion costs and instantaneous returns to competing land uses differently, causing the 
optimal land conversion rules will differ.        
     For each type of subsidy, the value functions need to satisfy the corresponding 
Bellman equations in the continuation region and the value matching and smooth pasting 
conditions on the boundaries of conversion. These conditions are summarized in table 2. 
Constant and variable subsidies will be added to the instantaneous return to switchgrass, which are  sw f   and  sw sw    , respectively. Under an insurance subsidy, the 
instantaneous payment in Bellman equation of  sw V is max ( , ) sw sw . The value-
matching conditions and smooth pasting conditions for these subsidies are the same as (5) 
and (6). For a one-time cost-sharing subsidy, the Bellman equations for  i V  are the same 
as (4), but the conversion cost  cs C is reduced by s in the value-matching condition for 
converting from corn-soybean to switchgrass. The smooth pasting condition is the same 
as (6).  
    The farmer‟s optimal land conversion rule under different forms of subsidy will be 
solved using the same projection method described in Appendix A. The subsidy levels 
need to be determined before the optimal land conversion model is solved.  To make a 
meaningful comparison, we need to calibrate the subsidy parameters such that the ENPVs 
of governmental payments over a period are the same. The details about the calibration 
are presented in the next section.  
Simulation of land use choice under different subsidy programs 
Given the optimal land conversion rule, a representative corn-soybean grower will 
convert land to switchgrass when  cs b  is reached while a representative switchgrass 
grower will convert to corn-soybean when  sc b  is reached. With stochastic returns, we 
can compute the ex ante expected probability of a unit of corn-soybean land converting to 
switchgrass within a period of time. Previous real option literature (e.g. Leahy 1993; 
Pyndick and Dixit 1994) has show that in a competitive industry the optimal investment 
policy derived in a single-firm partial equilibrium setting happens to coincide with the optimal policy rule in a general equilibrium if all firms share the same risky process.  
Given a large number of firms in that industry, the ex ante probability of investment will 
also measure the fraction of available investment we can expect to be implemented (see 
example Metcalf and Hasett 1995, Sarkar 2003).  In the case to predict the proportional 
land converted in to energy crops, we need to account for at least two more things. One is 
the crop price (or return) feedback effects caused by the land use change. Another is to 
model the farmers‟ heterogeneity. These may need a general stochastic dynamic model, 
which goes beyond the scope of our study. Nevertheless, the expected land conversion 
probability is indicative. We assume that governmental has a subsidy program whose 
goal is to cost effectively attract more land to grow energy crops. Given the same 
governmental budget, the higher probability of being in switchgrass that a subsidy 
program can engage, the more effective it is.   
    Given the optimal land conversion rules, we can simulate how the farmer responds to 
the changes of land use returns and calculate the governmental costs under different 
forms of subsidy. The simulation steps are illustrated by figure 2 and summarized in the 
following. Note that the steps in dotted rectangular are repeated.  
     First, we simulate N (=5000) sample paths of corn-soybean and switchgrass returns 
over 30 years according to the joint stochastic processes parameterized by values in table 
1, denoted by  ,, ( ( ),  ( )) cs n sw n tt   for n=1,2,…,5000 and t=0,1,2,…30. This is done 
with the Econometric Toolbox in Matlab. The initial returns are assumed to be 
(0) $119/ cs acre   at 2008 level and  (0) $133/ sw acre    at 2009 level for  n  , which 
are the most recent data we can obtain. The initial land use is corn-soybean production.     Second, for each type of subsidy, we initially select a subsidy level and solve the land 
conversion decision rules.   
Third, for each simulated path of corn-soybean and switchgrass returns, given critical 
land conversion boundaries under different types of subsidies, we can predict the land use 
assuming that the farmer acts according to the optimal land use decision rule. Each 
sample path of the two returns,  ,, {( ( ), ( )), 1,...,30}  cs n sw n t t t n   , is compared with the 
conversion boundaries, ( ( ),  ( ) c s s c bb   ) , to decide whether the land is kept in its 
current crop or should be converted to the alternative crop. For instance, in year 1, when 
the land is still in corn-soybean, the realized returns on a particular sample path, 
,, ( ( ), ( )) cs n sw n tt  , are compared with boundary cs b  . If the realized returns are in the 
“no action zone” (e.g., if  ,, (1) ( (1)) cs
sw n cs n b     according to the optimal decision 
rule), the land is kept in corn-soybean, and similar comparisons are made in year 2. If, on 
the other hand, the realized returns are in the “conversion zone” (i.e., if
,, (1) ( (1)) cs
sw n cs n b    ), the land is converted to switchgrass, and in year 2, the 
realized returns  ,, ( (2), (2)) cs n sw n  will be compared with boundary  sc b   to decide 
whether the land should be converted into corn-soybean.  We can also predict 
governmental payments based on the farmer‟s land use choice. Under constant subsidy, 
variable subsidy and insurance subsidy, the government pays the farmer f /acre,  sw 
/acre and max (0,() sw sw   )/acre per year, respectively when the farmer is in 
switchgrass production. Under the cost-sharing subsidy, once the farmer converts land from corn-soybean to switchgrass
4 or reestablishes after ten years of being in switchgrass, 
the government will pay s /acre to the farmer.  For each simulated path of corn-soybean 
and switchgrass returns, we calculate the NPVs of total governmental payments over 30 
years for each type of subsidy. The mean and standard error of the discounted 
governmental costs over the N simulated paths of the joint returns can be obtained for 
each type of subsidy during a 30 year period.  
  Fourth, we calibrate the subsidies by repeating steps 1-3 so that the ENPVs of 
governmental costs at the end of 30 years under different subsidies are equalized, at a 
level of $30/acre (±  $1). The calibrated subsidy parameters are presented in table 3. For 
each period we count the number of sample paths on which the land is in switchgrass. 
Dividing this number by N, we obtain the probability of land in switchgrass for each form 
of subsidy during a 30 year period. 
Results 
Critical land conversion boundaries under different forms of subsidies  
In this section we present the effects of different subsidies on a representative farmer‟s 
optimal land conversion rule.  In figure 3a-d, the solid curves are the critical boundaries 
cs b  and  sc b  under the no subsidy base case. The dashed curves are conversion 
boundaries under the four different subsidies.      
                                                 
4 The government can require that a farmer has to stay in switchgrass for some minimum number of years 
to receive the cost-sharing subsidy; otherwise he has to pay a penalty. In the simulation, we impose that the 
farmer can receive the subsidy only if he did not convert from switchgrass to corn-soybean in the past five 
years.       A constant subsidy increases the instantaneous return to switchgrass.  As expected, we 
can see from figure 3a that it lowers the conversion boundary from corn-soybean to 
switchgrass and raises the conversion boundary from switchgrass to corn-soybean. So it 
encourages farmers to convert to energy crops and discourages them from withdrawing.  
     Compared with a constant subsidy, a variable subsidy not only increases the 
switchgrass return but also its variability. This implies two opposite effects on the 
optimal land conversion decision: a higher return gives incentive to convert to 
switchgrass and a disincentive to withdraw land out of it, while more uncertainties will 
hold back converting to switchgrass and encourage converting out. Figure 3b shows that 
the return effect dominates the uncertainty effect on converting to switchgrass but the 
uncertainty effect dominates the return effect on converting out so that both  cs b  and 
sc b  are lowered compared with no subsidy case. However, this is not always the case.  
    Farmers are assumed to receive the insurance subsidy only when the switchgrass return 
is lower than sw  , which is $80/acre.  The insurance subsidy generally lowers the 
conversion boundary from corn-soybean to switchgrass, but the effect is more dramatic 
when the corn-soybean return is lower than $45/acre: farmers will convert to switchgrass 
even if its market return is zero since the subsidy can increase it to $70/acre.  Similarly, 
the subsidy raises the conversion boundary from switchgrass to corn-soybean much more 
when the switchgrass return is lower: for a switchgrass market return lower than $50/acre 
the farmers will not convert to corn-soybean until the latter reaches at least $145/acre 
(roughly). These effects gradually vanish when the switchgrass return goes beyond the 
insured level.      Different from the annual subsidies, a cost-sharing subsidy for switchgrass always 
lowers both direction land conversion boundaries (figure 3d).  While reducing the 
conversion costs from corn-soybean to switchgrass ( cs C ) makes the corn-soybean 
grower less reluctant to covert the land, it also has the indirect effect of making the 
switchgrass grower more prone to convert back to corn-soybean. This is because 
although the farmer currently growing switchgrass will not directly benefit from the 
subsidy for conversion to switchgrass, its existence reduces the expected cost of 
converting from corn-soybean back to switchgrass, thereby reducing the implied cost of 
switching back to corn-soybean. Thus it indirectly increases his incentive to convert land 
to corn-soybean. The direct effect of lowering  cs C is greater than the indirect effect. The 
reduction in  cs C  lowers the boundary from corn-soybean to switchgrass more than the 
boundary from switchgrass to corn-soybean.  
The probability of land in switchgrass under different forms of subsidies 
 The effects of a subsidy program on encouraging energy crop production can be 
illustrated more clearly using the probability of land in switchgrass over a 30 year period. 
By changing the optimal land conversion decision rule, the subsidy program will change 
the probability of land converted into energy crops as well as converting out. The lower 
the conversion boundary from corn-soybean to switchgrass, the more likely the realized 
returns can reach the boundary, so that the farmer will convert to switchgrass. Conversely, 
the lower the conversion boundary from switchgrass to corn-soybean, the more likely the 
realizations of the returns can reach the boundary, so that the farmer will convert out of 
switchgrass.    Figure 4 shows the expected probabilities of a unit corn-soybean land in switchgrass 
over a 30 year period under the no subsidy case and the four single subsidy program, 
given that the expected governmental cost is uniformly $30/acre at the end of 30 years.  
The cumulative probability is not monotonically increasing over the years because the 
farmer can optimally convert back to corn-soybean when its return is high enough and 
reach the conversion boundary  sc b  . We first examine the case without subsidy, 
indicated by the solid curve in figure 4.  At the beginning, the probability of land 
converted into switchgrass increases over years and peaks at 0.19 in year 9. However, the 
switchgrass return also has a higher level of uncertainty, and eventually land in 
switchgrass is likely to be converted back to corn-soybean. At the end of the 30 years, the 
probability of land in switchgrass is about 0.1. The average probability of land in 
switchgrass over 30 years is 0.14.  
 A constant subsidy lowers  cs b   and raises  sc b  , implying that it is easier to convert 
into switchgrass and harder to convert out. The conversion pattern over time is similar to 
the no subsidy case but the probability of land in swtichgrass peaks at 0.23 and stabilizes 
at 0.13, increased by 0.04 and 0.03 compared with the no subsidy case.  The average 
probability over all 30 years is also increased from 0.14 to 0.18. In contrast, the variable 
subsidy and cost-sharing subsidy lower both  cs b   and  sc b  (although for different 
reasons as we discussed above), implying that it is easier to convert into switchgrass as 
well as to convert out.  These two subsidy types raise the peak probability of land in 
switchgrass to 0.2 and 0.24, respectively, but barely change where it stabilizes. The 
variable subsidy increases the average probability of land in switchgrass over years from 
0.14 to 0.15 and the cost-sharing subsidy increases it to 0.17.  When both of the corn-soybean and switchgrass returns are low, the insurance subsidy 
effectively makes switchgrass the dominant choice. Once the return of corn-soybean falls 
below $45/acre, the land will be converted to switchgrass and will not be converted out 
until the corn-soybean return bounces back to at least $145/acre. So the insurance subsidy 
increases the probability of land in switchgrass the most, peaking at 0.24 and stabilizing 
at 0.2. The average probability over all 30 years is 0.2. 
The Change and Variation of Governmental Costs over Years 
Each subsidy program is calibrated such that it will incur the same expected 
governmental cost at the end of 30 years. However, these costs may change from year to 
year. This information is interesting because the government may prefer a policy program 
that has a stable stream of expenditures. Figure 5a shows the mean NPV of governmental 
costs under each subsidy over 30 years.  Since the cost-sharing subsidy is a relative large 
one-time payment and more conversion to switchgrass happen in the first several years, 
its expenditure grows faster in the beginning years (until year 6), slows down until 
intermediate period and stabilizes after year 15. The other three subsidies are annual 
payments, which increase steadily over the years.  
     We have assumed the risk-neutrality of government and an ex ante budget constraint 
and compared the cost-effectiveness of different subsidies. However, the performance of 
different subsidies could change if the government is risk averse, or has an ex post budget 
or both. Then less variability of the governmental expenditures will be more desirable. 
Figure 5b shows the simulated standard errors of the NPV of the governmental costs for 
each subsidy program over the 30 years. The standard error of the cost-sharing subsidy payment rises rapidly in the first 5 years and becomes steady at $40/acre since then.  The 
standard error of the constant subsidy payment keeps rising steadily to 46/acre at the end 
of 30 years. The distributions of other two subsidy payments are much more heavy-tailed. 
The simulated standard error is $165/acre and $80/acre, or 5.5 and 2.7 times of the mean 
under the variable subsidy payment and the insurance subsidy payment, respectively.    
The Effects of Combining Cost-sharing Subsidy with Other Types of Subsidies 
 In addition to considering the program implementing a single subsidy, we also evaluate 
the effectiveness of combining the lump-sum cost-sharing subsidy with other three types 
of annual subsidy, as often occurs in practice. For example, as we discussed above, Irish 
farmers can receive a subsidy up to half of establishment costs as well as a constant 
subsidy of  $70/acre for planting willow and miscanthus, while U.S. farmers can receive 
a subsidy up to 75% of the establishment costs and a 2-year variable subsidy that matches 
the biorefiner‟s payment for any eligible energy crop.  
     Again we compare the three forms of combined subsidies among themselves and with 
their single form subsidy counterpart by how they change the expected probability of  a 
unit of corn-soybean land converting to switchgrass. The simulation is performed given 
an expected governmental cost at $65/acre. The calibrated subsidy levels are presented in 
table 4. First we can examine the relative performance of the three combined subsidies. 
Figures 6 a-c show that consistent with the relative performance of the single subsidy 
forms, subsidizing the establishment costs and insuring a minimum return will result in 
the highest probability of land in switchgrass, which peaks at 0.3 and stabilizes at 0.2 at 
the end of 30 years and averages at 0.24. A constant subsidy together with a cost-sharing 
subsidy has 0.26 probability of land in switchgrass at the peak and 0.18 at the end of 30 years, averaging 0.2. A variable subsidy together with a cost-sharing subsidy will rank 
lowest, having probability of 0.22 for land growing switchgrass at peak and 0.11 at the 
end of 30 years and averaging 0.16. The average probability over years change little 
compared to the single forms, but single form subsidies have smaller variances. 
Compared with their single subsidy counterpart, the combined forms slightly increase the 
probability of land in switchgrass in the intermediate period but reduce it toward the latter 
part of a 30 year time horizon. This can be explained by the dual effects of the cost-
sharing subsidy on land conversion: it has a positive effect on the expected rate of 
converting land to switchgrass by lowering the conversion boundary  cs b   more than the 
annual subsidies but also has a negative effect by inducing land converting out later since 
it lowers the conversion boundary  sc b  .   
Conclusion 
This study examines the design of agricultural subsidy programs that aim to encourage 
desirable land use using a real options framework that reflects the following features: (a) 
the dynamic characteristics of land conversion; (b) the sunk costs and future return 
uncertainties associated with land conversion; and (c) flexibility in an optimizing, 
representative farmer‟s land use decisions. Results show that failure to consider these 
factors can lead to misleading conclusions.  Although the levels of different subsidy 
forms were selected to be ENPV-equivalent, they are not equally cost-effective.  
     Using energy crop production as an example, we compare three annual subsidies and 
one lump-sum subsidy that have the same expected governmental costs. The insurance 
subsidy results in the highest expected probability of land being converted to energy crops (switchgrass), followed by the constant subsidy.  Although the cost-sharing subsidy 
and the variable subsidy have the positive effect of encouraging land conversion to 
switchgrass, they also have the negative effect of discouraging land from staying in that 
land use. The two effects cancel each other out and result in an increase in the predicted 
probability of land in switchgrass in the intermediate period but a drop back to the no-
subsidy level at the end of 30 years. The relative performance of combing cost-sharing 
subsidy with other annual subsidies is consistent with comparison of single subsidies.  
    The results presented in this paper suggest that the existing U.S. energy crop subsidy 
system, which is a variable subsidy combined with a cost-sharing subsidy, may not be the 
most cost-effective. Greater cost-effectiveness of the insurance subsidy highlights the 
research needs for how to reduce the uncertainties of the returns to energy crops. 
Taheripour and Tyner (2008) propose a subsidy that is inversely related with the oil 
price
5  in order to reduce the volatility of energy crop prices. Compared with the 
government providing an insurance policy, the long-term contract between energy crop 
growers and biorefiners may serve as a better mechanism considering the possible 
transaction costs involved in the former.  
    There is a caveat in evaluating the performance of cost-sharing subsidy based on our 
results. We only consider the cost-effectiveness of a subsidy, i.e., the ability to convert 
land to switchgrass given the same governmental expenditures. But there are other factors 
that justify the cost-sharing subsidy, one of which is the farmer‟s liquidity constraint. 
Numerous studies show farmers are concerned about the large up-front costs of 
establishing the energy crops (e.g. Sherrington, Bartley and Moran 2008; Bocqueho and 
                                                 
5 They call it the variable subsidy, which clearly is different from the one in our paper.  Jacquet 2010). A cost-sharing subsidy can relax this constraint and thus reduce the 
adoption barriers.          
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      2009, Atlanta, GA. Available at http://purl.umn.edu/45985. Table 1. Parameters for Solving Optimal Land Conversion Rule without Subsidies 
Land conversion model parameters  Notation and Value 
Discount factor 
   
r      0.08 
Drift rate of corn-soy return 
 
cs u    0.04 
Drift rate of switchgrass return  sw u    0.04 
Variance parameter of corn-soy return 
 
cs      0.29 
Variance parameter of switchgrass return 
 
sw     0.62 
Land conversion cost from corn-soy to switchgrass           
cs C     $139/acre 
Land conversion cost from switchgrass to corn-soy         
sw C     $47/acre Table 2. Land Conversion Optimality under Different Subsidies 
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Table 3. Parameters for Policy Simulation: Single Subsidy 
Subsidy form  Subsidy level 
Constant subsidy  $ 14.5/acre 
Variable subsidy  2% 
Insurance subsidy  $ 80/acre 
Cost-sharing subsidy  $ 110/acre 
Governmental costs  $30/acre 
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Table 4. Parameters for Policy Simulation: Single Subsidy vs. Combined Subsidy 
 
Combined form  Single form 
Cost-sharing subsidy  70/acre 
  Constant subsidy  $ 19/acre  $29/acre 
Variable subsidy  3%  4% 
Insurance subsidy  $ 80/acre  $111/acre 
Governmental costs  $65/acre 
   




Figure 1. Optimal Land Conversion Rule: No Subsidy   
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Figure 2. Land Conversion Simulation Steps
Outputs are state of land use, the means 
and standard errors of expected 
governmental costs in each period.  
4. Repeat steps 1-3 for each type of 
subsidy until their expected governmental 
costs at end of 30 years are equal.  
 Obtain the probability of land in 
switchgrass,  means and standard errors of 
governmental costs over the 30 years.  
3. Predict the land use in each period 
and the governmental costs.  
Obtain 5000 paths of return pairs over 30 
years. 
 
2. Select a subsidy level and solve the 
land conversion model.  
1. Simulate the realized returns of corn-
soy and switchgrass for 5000 times using 
known parameters of the stochastic 
processes and 2009 return values over 30 
years.  
  
Obtain critical land conversion 
boundaries under each type of 




   
 
 
     
Figure 3. Optimal Land Conversion Rule under Different Subsidies  
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Figure 4. Probability of Land in Switchgrass: Comparison of Single Subsidy 
(Expected NPV of Governmental Costs=$30/acre) 
Note: The average probability of years: 0.2 for the insurance subsidy, 0.18 for the constant subsidy, 0.17 
for the cost-sharing subsidy, 0.15 for the variable subsidy, and 0.14 for the no subsidy case.  





















































Figure 5a. Mean NPV of Governmental Costs over Years 
 

















































































































Figure 6. Effect of combining cost-sharing subsidy with annual subsidy (expected 
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